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TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Amendment V of the Constitution of the United States provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.
Amendment VI of the Constitution of the United States provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defence.
Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United States provides in
pertinent part:
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.

iv

Article I, § 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases . . . .
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds
of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides in pertinent part:
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to
prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show
that he acted in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.

v

Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides in pertinent part:
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of
crime•
(a) General rule. For the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence
that he has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if elicited from him or established by
public record during cross-examination but only if
the crime (1) was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law
under which he was convicted, and the court
determines that the probative value of admitting
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to
the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.

vi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

v.

:

RANDALL D. TUCKER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 890423-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a district
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a
first degree or capital felony.

In this case, the Honorable

Michael R. Murphy, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, rendered final judgment and
conviction against Mr. Tucker for the crime of Theft, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953 as amended).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the trial court commit reversible error when it allowed
the prosecutor to elicit otherwise inappropriate details of the plea
bargained conviction for attempted forgery overruling the objections
of Mr. Tucker and refusing to grant a mistrial?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for Theft,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404
(1953 as amended).

Following two days of trial, May 17 and 18,

1989, a jury acquitted Mr. Tucker of Burglary, Count II of the
indictment, but found him guilty of Theft, Count III of the
indictment.

Judgment and conviction was imposed by the Honorable

Michael R. Murphy of the Third Judicial District Court who then
sentenced Mr. Tucker to zero to five years incarceration at the Utah
State Prison and ordered him to pay a fine of $1,250 plus 25%
surcharge.

The court then stayed the prison sentence and placed

Mr. Tucker on probation for thirty-six months with conditions of
probation including payment of the fine; a six-month jail term;
recoupment of attorney fees in the amount of $1,000; and
participation in and completion of an alcohol treatment program to
be sponsored by Orange Street.

This appeal challenges the validity

of the conviction for Theft.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Randall D. Tucker, Appellant in this case, and
co-defendant, Henry Kanares, were charged in a combined information
of three counts each (R. 9-11).

Count I involved a burglary of a

small shed located at 1186 South Redwood Road in Salt Lake County
which occurred on or about March 27, 1989.

Count II involved a

burglary of that same shed at the same location on or about
March 29, 1989.

Count III involved a theft from the same location
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on or about March 29, 1989,

Both parties originally pleaded not

guilty to all three counts.

Count I, however, was dismissed as

against Appellant, Randall D. Tucker, at the preliminary hearing
held in circuit court (R. 3-4).
The trial was scheduled May 17-18, 1989.

On the morning of

the first day of trial, co-defendant, Henry Kanares, opted to
withdraw his pleas of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to
Count II of the Information (R. 45-51, 54). Counts I and III were
then dismissed against him (R. 54). Appellant, Randall Tucker,
insisting he was not guilty of the charges, proceeded to trial on
Count II and Count III, the burglary and theft of property charges
from the small shed located at 1186 South Redwood Road on or about
March 29, 1989.
Prior to trial, Mr. Tucker filed a Motion in Limine to
prohibit the State from introducing evidence of prior convictions
against him (R. 55-56).

That motion was argued to the court on the

first day of trial (R. 123 at 2-15).

The State insisted and the

court agreed that a prior conviction of attempted forgery from 1988
would be admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence as a crime of dishonesty or false statement (R. 123 at 11,
15).

The trial court required that the official file of Mr. Tucker

from that attempted forgery case be produced from the records
department and examined (R. 123 at 9).

Mr. Tucker had pleaded

guilty to that charge, and, from that file, the trial court later
placed into evidence Stated Exhibit 16-S, the Affidavit of
Defendant (R. 125 at 45).

Based on that Affidavit of Defendant,
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which detailed the plea agreement in that case including the element
of intent to defraud, the trial court supported its ruling to deny
Mr. Tucker's Motion in Limine (R. 123 at 11-15).

Nonetheless,

Mr. Tucker requested a continuing objection to the admission of the
prior conviction evidence as impeachment testimony, and the same was
granted (R. 123 at 15).
At trial, the testimony of Mr. Tucker disclosed that he had
known Mr. Kanares for approximately one year prior to March 29, 1989
(R. 125 at 15).

Co-defendant Kanares was a friend of his mother's

boyfriend (R. 125 at 16).

Mr. Tucker met Mr. Kanares through that

relationship when Mr. Kanares asked Mr. Tucker to work as a mechanic
to repair Mr. Kanares' automobile (R. 125 at 15-16).

Mr. Tucker

testified that on March 29, 1989, he examined Mr. Kanares' car and
that the 29th was the only day he had ever actually been with
Mr. Kanares (R. 125 at 16).

After working on Mr. Kanares' car, he

explained that he needed a ride home and that Mr. Kanares agreed to
drive him to his home (R. 125 at 17). Mr. Tucker testified that
enroute to his house, while traveling on Redwood Road, Mr. Kanares
informed Mr. Tucker that he (Mr. Kanares) needed to stop and pick up
some property (R. 125 at 17).
Mr. Kanares and Mr. Tucker then pulled into a large
driveway off Redwood Road near a small shack just prior to noon.
Mr. Kanares got out of the car and went to the shack.
remained at the car (R. 123 at 19; R. 125 at 18).

Mr. Tucker

Within moments, a

ninety-year-old man, later identified as Mr. Harvey D. Hansen,
arrived at the property in his own automobile and parked behind that
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of Mr, Kanares (R. 125 at 18-19).

Mr. Hansen informed Mr. Tucker

that it was his property and asked Mr. Tucker what they were doing
there (R. 123 at 21; R. 125 at 19).

Testimony of the parties

differs from this point forward.
Mr. Hansen testified that the trunk of Mr. Kanares' car was
opened and that property belonging to him and his son were within
the trunk of the car and on the back seat (R. 123 at 17).

He

indicated that he knew what was going on—implying a burglary and
theft—and that it was important he get a description of the car and
the license plate (R. 123 at 22).

Mr. Hansen testified that he then

copied down the number of the license plate (R. 123 at 22).

He

testified that while he was noting the license plate number, another
individual returned to the car from the shed (R. 123 at 28).

He

explained that Mr. Tucker and this other individual then got in the
car and drove away (R. 123 at 22).

He returned to his residence,

called the Salt Lake City Police Department, and gave them the
information including the license number (R. 123 at 23).
Salt Lake City police officers responded in a joint effort
with West Valley City police officers to the address of Mr. Kanares,
a trailer park in West Valley City (R. 125 at 7).

At that

residence, the officers located Mr. Kanares, the automobile, and
ultimately Mr. Tucker, who had been hiding under a bed in a bedroom
of the mobile home (R. 125 at 6).

Mr. Hansen was brought to the

property; he identified the automobile and some of the property
within the automobile as belonging to himself and his son (R. 123 at
78-80).

Mr. Kanares and Mr. Tucker were also identified and placed
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under arrest (R. 123 at 79-81) .
Mr. Tucker7s testimony contradicted that of Mr. Hansen.

He

indicated that while at the residence on March 29, 1989, no property
was actually placed in the automobile; that after Mr. Hansen had
arrived at the address, Mr. Kanares informed Mr. Tucker that they
needed to return to his place in West Valley City where Mr. Kanares
began to load property from the residence into the automobile to
return to the location on Redwood Road (R. 125 at 20-22).
Mr. Tucker admitted that he had been found hiding under the bed in a
bedroom at the trailer court and explained that he was scared at the
sight of the police officers (R. 125 at 23).

Mr. Tucker explained

that he feared he would get into trouble, and on the suggestion of
another, went in the bedroom to hide (R. 125 at 23).

Mr. Tucker

further testified that, to his knowledge, no crime had been
committed.

He admitted that once Mr. Hansen had arrived, he had a

"bad inkling that something wrong was going on" but, at that point,
was still unsure (R. 12 5 at 30).

He further testified that it was

he who actually read the number of the license plate to Mr. Hansen
while Mr. Hansen wrote it down (R. 125 at 32).
During direct examination, Mr. Tucker admitted the
attempted forgery conviction of 1988, indicating the nature of the
circumstances surrounding the commission of that offense (R. 125 at
24-25).

He explained that he had shared an account with his sister

and that when she refused to release money to him, he forged her
name on a check (R. 125 at 25).

He affirmed that he had pled guilty

to the crime (R. 125 at 25).
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On cross-examinationf the prosecutor questioned in detail
Mr. Tucker's recollection of the attempted forgery conviction,
soliciting from him information which exceeded that contained in the
plea agreement and which included questioning about an alleged
although uncharged cocaine drug involvement (R. 125 at 25-27).

An

objection was lodged with the court regarding the examination of the
prosecutor into details of the prior conviction, specifically
pointing out the Rule 404(b) violations inherent in such examination
(R. 125 at 27).

A side bar was held out of the hearing of the jury

where Mr. Tucker additionally lodged a Motion for Mistrial, later
placed on the record and denied by the trial court (R. 125 at 27,
39-43).
In support of the prosecution's case, Mr. Harvey D.
Hansen's son, Thomas Franklin Hansen, was also called to testify.
He identified property which had been taken from the shed at the
Redwood Road address and substantiated the values of that property
(R. 123, 48-49, 59). Thomas Hansen confirmed that the shed had been
broken into on other occasions and specifically that the shed had
been broken into several days before March 29 (R. 123 at 54).
Several police officers were also called as witnesses for
the State.

Daniel R. Despain, a Salt Lake City patrolman, testified

that he was the officer who had accompanied Mr. Hansen, Sr. to West
Valley City to the trailer home of Mr. Kanares.

He substantiated

that, at that premises, Mr. Hansen identified several pieces of
property located in the automobile of Mr. Kanares (R. 123 at 80).
Grant Elsby, a West Valley City police officer, testified
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that he was the first officer to arrive at the address of
Mr. Kanares (R. 125 at 2-3, 8). He testified that upon entering the
residence, Mr. Kanares denied the presence of another individual
but, after seeking permission to look, he located Mr. Tucker hiding
under a bed (R. 125 at 6).

Officer Elsby further testified that

upon arrival, two West Valley City Police cars showed up along with
two, maybe three, from Salt Lake City (R. 125 at 7).

He testified

that several of the officers were uniformed (R. 125 at 8 ) .
After the defense rested, the prosecutor asked for a short
recess, during the conclusion of which he informed defense counsel
he would call Mr. Kanares as a rebuttal witness.

Over objection,

Mr. Kanares testified on direct examination that he committed the
March 29 burglary and that Mr. Tucker assisted him to move property
from the inside of the shed to the outside and then to the
automobile (R. 125 at 66).

On cross-examination, Mr. Kanares

admitted that he had told Mr. Tucker's counsel on no less than three
occasions that Mr. Kanares had acted alone and that Mr. Tucker was
not responsible for any criminal act (R. 125 at 69).

Mr. Kanares

testified that the State had not done anything to procure his
testimony (R. 125 at 75).

On recross-examination, he did

acknowledge that two other third degree felony charges were
dismissed against him by the State (R. 125 at 75).
The case was ultimately presented to the jury, who, after
deliberations, acquitted Mr. Tucker of the burglary charge but
convicted him of theft (R. 59, 60, 65-66).
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This appeal followed.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court committed plain error and/or abused its
discretion by permitting the State to cross-examine for impeachment
purposes beyond the mere fact of the conviction.

The trial court

overruled an objection to the improper impeachment and also denied a
Motion for Mistrial, both founded on Rule 404(b), erroneously ruling
that the door had been opened on direct examination and that
Rule 404(b) was inappropriate to the issue. Mr. Tucker did not open
the door to such testimony; but even assuming he had, competent case
authority forbids impeachment by prior conviction evidence to
violate Rule 404(b).

The trial court's erroneous ruling requires

reversal of Mr. Tucker's conviction.

ARGUMENT
POINT
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY
PERMITTING THE STATE TO INTRODUCE INAPPROPRIATE
DETAILS AND ALLEGATIONS BEYOND THE PERMISSIBLE
IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE OF THE PRIOR CONVICTION OF
ATTEMPTED FORGERY.
Prior to trial, Mr. Tucker filed a motion in limine to
prohibit the State from using prior convictions of Mr. Tucker to
impeach his testimony if he were to take the stand in his own behalf
(R. 55-56).

That motion was argued on the first day of trial out of

the presence of the jury (R. 123 at 2-15).

The court ruled that a

1988 misdemeanor conviction for attempted forgery would be
appropriate for impeachment purposes and denied the motion (R. 123
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at 12-15) . Mr. Tucker sought and obtained a continuing objection to
that ruling (R. 123 at 15).
Mr. Tucker testified in his own behalf and admitted the
1988 misdemeanor conviction of attempted forgery (R. 125 at 24-25).
On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Mr. Tucker on
unadjudicated details of the plea bargained conviction beyond the
permissible scope of cross-examination for impeachment purposes
(R. 125 at 25-27).

The prosecutor also introduced contested claims

of problems of cocaine usage by Mr. Tucker (R. 125 at 27).
Mr. Tucker objected to the examination of the prosecutor; a side bar
was held, and the court allowed the questioning to continue over the
objection of Mr. Tucker (R. 125 at 27-29).

(A verbatim reproduction

of the attempted forgery examination is contained infra at
subpoint D and attached at Addendum A.)
At the conclusion of Mr. Tucker's testimony, the defense
rested and a recess was taken by the court (R. 125 at 38).

On

returning from the recess, out of the presence of the jury,
Mr. Tucker made a motion for a mistrial previously reserved at the
side bar noted above (R. 125 at 39-40).

That mistrial motion

complained that the prosecutor introduced information beyond the
conviction of attempted forgery contrary to impeachment principles
and evidence rule 404(b) (R. 125 at 40-41).

The trial court denied

the new trial motion ruling that Mr. Tucker had "opened the door"
entitling the prosecution to address the questions asked on
cross-examination (R. 125 at 41-42).

The trial court then ruled

that a copy of the affidavit from the 1988 attempted forgery case be
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marked and made a part of the record instructing that it was not to
be provided to the jury (R. 125 at 44-47; Exhibit 16-S)•
Mr. Tucker avers that the trial court committed prejudicial
error when it overruled his objection to the State's
cross-examination beyond the mere fact of the conviction.

The trial

court also erred in denying the motion for a mistrial as the
prosecutor had improperly introduced allegations of drug usage into
the prior conviction of attempted forgery.

Mr. Tucker urges that he

did not open the door to such testimony; but even assuming he had
opened the door, the cross-examination of the prosecutor exceeded
permissible impeachment and violated Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules
of Evidence prejudicing the jury against him.

A.

MR. TUCKER'S 1988 CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED
FORGERY IS A CRIME OF DISHONESTY OR FALSE
STATEMENT.

Subsequent to Mr. Tuckers trial, this Court held in
State v. Ross, 782 P.2d 529, 530-31 (Utah App. 1989), that a prior
conviction for attempted forgery is automatically admissible for
impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.

Mr. Tucker acknowledged in his Affidavit of Defendant

when pleading guilty to the attempted forgery the element of
"purpose to defraud."

He now concedes the prior conviction was

admissible for impeachment purposes.
Despite that concession, however, prejudicial error
occurred in his case when the prosecutor exceeded permissible
impeachment practices by going beyond the facts of the case as
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articulated in the plea bargain agreement and introduced other
crimes, wrongs or acts contrary to Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.

B.

IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION EVIDENCE IS
LIMITED TO NARROW INQUIRIES ONLY.

A long established principle of jurisprudence recognizes
that impeachment by prior conviction evidence must be limited to
questioning the defendant on the narrow area of conviction, nature
of the crime and punishment.

United States v. Wolf, 561 F.2d 1376

(10th Cir. 1977) . Some courts have offered variations of the
permissible cross-examination by allowing questions into the subject
of crime, date and disposition, see Campbell v. Greer. 831 F.2d 700
(7th Cir. 1987) , and cases cited therein, and a few courts have
allowed questioning regarding the length of confinement.

United

States v. Barnes, 622 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1980), and cases cited
therein.
Courts have routinely cautioned that care must be taken
during impeachment by prior conviction evidence to not permit
counsel to explore the details of a witness7 past convictions,
United States v. Castro. 788 F.2d 1240 (7th Cir. 1986), and further
indicated the scope of the cross-examination should be so limited to
avoid the confusion of collateral issues and to avoid unfairness to
the defendant.

United States v. Roeniqk, 810 F.2d 809, 814-15 (8th

Cir. 1987).
The above-noted rule acknowledging that it is error to
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inquire about the details of prior criminal conduct is so well
established that such error is cognizable despite the absence of any
objection by defense counsel.

United States v. Harding, 525 F.2d

84, 88-89 (7th Cir. 1975) (citing United States v. Dow, 457 F.2d
246, 250 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Mitchell, 427 F.2d 644,
647 (3rd Cir. 1970); and United States v. Pennix. 313 F.2d 524, 531
(4th Cir. 1963).

Courts have further held that a cautionary

instruction limiting the scope of the permissible impeachment by
prior conviction evidence cannot correct the error and obviate the
prejudice to the defendant.

United States v. Dow, 457 F.2d 246,

248-49 (7th Cir. 1972).
Courts have identified that the problem with excessive
references to details of prior criminal conduct is that the jury is
likely to infer that the defendant is more likely to have committed
the offense for which he is being tried than if he had previously
led a blameless life.

United States v. Harding, 525 F.2d 84, 89

(7th Cir. 1975) ; see 1A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 57 at 1185 (Tillers
rev. 1983) ("The deep tendency of human nature to punish not because
our victim is guilty this time but because he is a bad man and may
as well be condemned now that he is caught is a tendency that cannot
fail to operate with any jury, in or out of court.11); see, also.
United States v. Roenigk, 810 F.2d 809, 815 (8th Cir. 1987).
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C.

AN EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE EXISTS BUT
THAT EXCEPTION IS LIMITED BY CONSIDERATIONS OF
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS AND UNDUE PREJUDICE AS
GUIDED BY EVIDENCE RULES 403 AND 404.

Importantly, an exception to the above rule which limits
the prosecutor's ability to query into details of the conviction has
been noted as "whenever defendant attempts to explain away the
effect of a conviction or to minimize his guilt, [he] may be
cross-examined on any facts relevant to direct examination."
States v. Amahia. 825 F.2d 177, 179 (8th Cir. 1987).

United

See, also.

United States v. Wolf. 561 F.2d 1376 (10th Cir. 1977) (defendant has
no right to set forth to the jury all of the facts which tend in his
favor without laying himself open to cross-examination on those
facts); United States v. Barnes. 622 F.2d 107, 109 (5th Cir. 1980)
(prosecutor permitted to elicit length of incarceration from
defendant in response to defendant's attempt to "explain away" his
prior conviction).
This exception to the general rule—forbidding examination
into details of the prior convictions unless the defendant attempts
to "explain away" the conviction—is itself limited.

Courts have

explained that wnile room is allowed for prosecutors to counter a
defendant's attempt to "explain away" a conviction, care must be
taken during that cross-examination to avoid Rule 404(b) problems.
United States v. Wolf. 561 F.2d 1376, 1380-81 (10th Cir. 1977)
(trend to restrict prejudicing prior conviction evidence culminated
in adoption of Rules 609, 404(b) and 103(d) of the Rules of
Evidence; care should be taken to protect the accused from being
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convicted because of past conduct and not the current charges);
United States v. Tumblin. 551 F.2d 1001, 1004-05 (5th Cir. 1977)
(evidence of prior convictions is to be considered for impeachment
purposes only, and theme permitting the conviction to establish
conformity with criminal behavior requires reversal).

D.

THE EXAMINATION OF MR. TUCKER REGARDING HIS
PRIOR CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED FORGERY VIOLATED
PROPER IMPEACHMENT PRINCIPLES TO HIS DETRIMENT.

At the conclusion of Mr. Tucker's direct examination, his
counsel questioned him as follows:
Q

(By Ms. Wells) Mr. Tucker, have you previously
been convicted of any criminal offenses?

A

Yes.

Q

And what was that offense and when?

A

In March of 1988 I was convicted of a forgery,
attempted forgery. Attempted forgery, Class A
misdemeanor.

Q

And that was a misdemeanor rather than a felony?

A

Yes.

Q

Would you please explain briefly the
circumstances surrounding that offense and your
ultimate conviction? Let me ask: Did you
enter a plea in that matter?

A

Yes.

Q

What were the circumstances surrounding that
case?

A

My sister and I were sharing a house, and I was
putting my money into her bank account. We had
a dispute and I wanted my money out of her
account. It's a joint account with my mothers
name on the checks.
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She wouldn't refund my money, my parents were
on vacation and I needed my money cause I was
moving out of the house. And in order to get
another house I needed my money. So I forged
my sister's signature to get my money.
Q

How much money was involved?

A

Less than $100.

Q

Again, did you enter a plea of guilty after
being charged with that offense?

A

Yes.

(R. 125 at 24-25).

Direct examination was then completed and the

prosecutor began his cross-examination.
Q

[by Mr. Jones] Mr. Tucker, do you think you
have a good recollection of the case for which
you pled guilty to?

A

Do I —

Q

The attempted forgery that you just talked
about to the jury?

A

Oh, yes.

Q

Isn't it true that you stole five checks from
your mother?

A

Yes.

Q

One of the checks—the one you pled guilty to
was in excess of $500, wasn't it?

A

I think so.

Q

So you are not telling the Jury that you stole
$100, are you?

A

No.

Q

How much, all totaled, did you steal from your
mother through those checks?

A

Number one, I didn't steal it.
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It was my money.

Q

Well, you took checks, you stole blank checks
from your mother, didn't you?

A

I did.

Q

And you forged her signature on five of those?

A

I did.

Q

How much money did you take?

A

I would say around six hundred something.

Q

You are telling us that the one check was in
excess of $500 and the other four altogether
only totaled $100?

A

There was a few that were not cashed. There
was one in my wallet that had never been cashed.

Q

Well, isn't it true that you had had these
checks for some time?

A

Yes.

Q

How long had you had these checks?

A

Probably three days.

Q

You didn't have them more like three months?

A

I don't think so.

Q

Isn't it true that the reason that you took the
checks and cashed them was to support your drug
habit?

A

No.

MS. WELLS: Your Honor, I would object—I would ask
the Court for a ruling and would like to approach
the Bench.
THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the objection.
The door has been opened as to the purpose for the
money on direct examination.
MS. WELLS: I don't believe that the door was opened
in that it wasn't asked of him for what purpose. He
merely said it was his money. And I think what this
does is goes to a rule of evidence 404 problem.
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THE COURT:

Do you need to proceed further on this?

MR. JONES:

I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT:
moment.

Let's come to the side bar for just a

(Bench conference off the record.)
THE COURT:

The objection is overruled.

Q

(By Mr. Jones) Mr. Tucker, is it your
testimony to the Jury that the only reason you
took those five checks is because you were
entitled to the money?

A

Yes.

Q

Do you remember filling out a statement, kind
of a questionnaire or statement why you took
that money?

A

To a certain degree, yes.

Q

Did you ever tell anyone in that statement that
the reason you took the money was to support a
drug habit?

A

I can't remember.

Q

Were you on cocaine in April of 1988?

A

Had I used cocaine?

Q

Yes.

A

A few times, yes.

Q

Did you have a drug problem?

A

Not really a problem.

Q

Well, have you entered or been ordered to go
into a drug rehabilitation program?

A

I completed it, yes.

Q

Did you complete the program?

A

Yes.
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Q

And when was that?

A

I was ordered in, I think, June of 1988, to go.

Q

Was it your testimony that you didn't have a
drug problem at the time you entered that plea?

A

No.

I entered a plea of guilty.

Q

Excuse me, in April of 1988—

A

Yes, sir.

Q

—you had a drug problem at that time?

A

It was going to become a problem, yes.

Q

What about in March of 1989?

A
Q

I have been clean for over a year.
You were unemployed at the time of this
incident?

A

Yes.

Q

And it's your testimony that you just happened
to be in the wrong place at the wrong time on
March 29, 1989?

A

So to speak.

Q

You had no idea what your friend was up to?

A

Exactly.

Q

You weren't on drugs that day?

A

No.

Q

Is it true that the only person who was hiding
when the officers got there was yourself?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

And your testimony is that Mr. Kanares is the
one who was responsible for this burglary and
theft; is that right?

A

Yes.

-

1Q

-

Q

But he wasn't hiding, was he?

A

No, he was not.

Q

And the only reason you were hiding is because
you were afraid?

A

That, and I had a speeding ticket that had went
to a warrant, and I have done thirty days in
jail on the forgery, and I had no desire to go
back to jail.

Q

You weren't hiding, I guess, because of what
happened over at Mr. Hansen's property?

A

No.

At the time on the forgery I was beat up

real bad by the police, and again that same day.
(R. 125 at 25-29).
At the first opportunity following Mr. Tucker's testimony,
a Motion for Mistrial—previously reserved at the side bar noted
above—was placed on the record (R. 125 at 38-41).

Counsel

expressly stated her concerns regarding 404(b) violations which
prejudiced Mr. Tucker (R. 125 at 40-41).

The trial court disagreed

and responded that Rule 404(b) was not appropriately involved in the
consideration; he denied the Motion for Mistrial (R. 125 at 41-42).
(The motion as placed on the record and the court's ruling are
reproduced at Addendum B.)
E.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE
ERROR.

Several problems exist with the trial court's ruling to
permit the deviation from the normal rule in this case.

First, the

prior conviction in this case involved a plea bargained adjudication
and not a conviction following a trial.
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The trial court expressly

recognized this fact earlier in the case when it sent the court
bailiff to the record department for the official file in this case
and removed from that file and had placed into evidence a copy of
the Affidavit of Defendant, the plea agreement in this case (R. 123
at 7-10; R. 125 at 44-45).

That agreement indicates that the prior

conviction of Mr. Tucker for attempted forgery establishes the
elements as follows:
Defendant attempted to make, complete, execute,
authenticate, issue, or utter a check having a face
amount less than $100.00 so that such purported to
be the act of another, with the purpose to defraud.
State's Exhibit 16-S; see Addendum C.

The facts of the case are

listed as:
Defendant presented a check for cashing knowing it
was forged and he had no permission.
State's Exhibit 16-S; see Addendum C.
The additional questioning brought out on cross-examination
by the prosecutor in this case exceeded the adjudicated facts.
Rule 609 clearly indicates, as do the cases noted above, that only
convictions are permissible inquiry during impeachment by
cross-examination.

It has been long established that neither

arrests nor unlitigated allegations are a permissible basis for
impeachment evidence.

United States v. Pennix. 313 F.2d 524, 529

(4th Cir. 1963).
The Utah Supreme Court has discussed the problem of
attempting to impeach a witness with the unlitigated details of a
plea bargained prior conviction.

In Terrv v. ZCMI, 605 P.2d 314,

323 (Utah 1979), the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
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decision that considerations of delay, confusion of issues, the
potential for misleading the jury, and prejudice to the defendant
warranted exclusion of the "substantive facts" of a plea bargained
conviction because it would result in a retrial of the case.

The

Court stated:
The prior arrest was followed by a guilty plea by
the plaintiff. Due to the lack of a trial on the
merits in the first instance many controverted
points concerning that incident would have to be
tried for the first time at the present proceeding.
Id. at 323 n.29.
The Affidavit of Defendant comprised the adjudicated facts
of the attempted forgery conviction.

Mr. Tucker pleaded guilty to

one forged check of an amount less than one hundred dollars.
Addendum C.

See

The prosecutor, however, introduced the jurors to five

checks with a total value of six hundred dollars (R. 125 at 25-26).
Additionally, he wrongly characterized the amount of the forged
check contained in the plea bargained conviction as a check in
excess of five hundred dollars rather than a check of less than one
hundred dollars.

Compare R. 125 at 26 with Addendum C.

Finally,

the prosecutor introduced a new crime or wrong into the attempted
forgery conviction by referring to the theft of the five checks and
managing to reiterate the words "stole," "steal" or "took" on no
less than eight occasions during the supposed impeachment inquiry
(R. 125 at 25-28).
While the above unadjudicated details were not specifically
objected to at trial, Mr. Tucker now insists their presentation to
the jurors constituted plain error.

He urges that this Court agree
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with the concerns noted by the Court in Terry v, ZCMI that the State
not be permitted to try its attempted forgery case for the first
time as a part of the theft case against him.
Second, the impeachment rule, Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, focuses on credibility concerns only.

At issue in

impeachment evaluations is whether the defendant may take the stand
and testify untruthfully.

The jury is entitled to be aware of only

those convictions which may impugn his credibility.

See State v.

Bruce. 779 P.2d 646, 653-56 (Utah 1989); State v. Lanier, 778 P.2d
9, 11 (Utah 1989); State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325, 1333-35 (Utah
1986); see, also. United States v. Roeniqk, 810 F.2d 809 (8th Cir.
1987); United States v. Harding. 525 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1975).

Even

assuming that Mr. Tucker's testimony can be categorized as an
attempt to explain away or minimize his conviction, the ability of
the prosecutor to introduce other details beyond the plea bargained
conviction must be consistent with the impeachment purpose.

As

noted above, impeachment inquiries are appropriately proscribed
whenever such evidence may be misused to prove conformity with the
purported bad character of a person.

Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of

Evidence (1983) ; see subpoint C, supra.

The prosecutor's questions

in this case went beyond impeachment in an attempt to establish bad
character in violation of Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Mr. Tucker specifically objected based on Rule 404(b)
claiming that the allegations of cocaine usage coupled with
unemployment charges directly implicated bad character prohibited by
Rule 404(b).

The objection to this questioning should have been
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sustained and the Motion for Mistrial should have been granted•
This issue is properly preserved for appeal and may be decided on an
abuse of discretion standard.
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show
that he acted in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983).

Neither the rule itself

nor interpretations of the rule under Utah case law allows the
comparison of periods of unemployment nor introduction of drug
(cocaine) usage into this case for any reason, let alone for
impeachment purposes.

In State v, Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah

1989), the Supreme Court stated that evidence of other crimes,
wrongs or acts may be admitted only if such evidence has "a special
relevance to a controverted issue and is introduced for a purpose
other than to show the defendant's predisposition to criminality.11
Id. at 426 (quoting State v. Shickles. 760 P.2d 291, 295 (Utah 1988)
citing State v. Saunders. 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985)).
Relying on State v. Featherson. this Court reiterated that
other crimes evidence that passes the 404(b) test (i.e., relevant
beyond proving mere criminal disposition) is still subject to the
protections of Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Cox. 127 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Ct. App. January 31, 1990).
provides:
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State v.
Rule 403

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983).

The application of

Rule 403 requires balancing the probative value of the questioned
evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice; the balancing
contemplates considerations such as the need for the evidence and
the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to
overmastering hostility.

State v. Coxf 127 Utah Adv. Rep. at 19

(citing State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d at 295).
The Utah Supreme Court has defined the notion of "unfair
prejudice" as follows:
The term "prejudicial" should be construed to mean
inflammatory in the sense that the jury may use the
conviction against the defendant for purposes other
than determining the defendant's credibility, and
therefore would tend to induce the jury to render a
verdict outside the relevant substantive evidence
bearing on the material elements of the crime.
State v. Slowe. 728 P.2d 110, 112-13 (Utah 1986).

The trial court's

ruling permitted the State, under the guise of impeachment, to
examine Mr. Tucker in a method which placed before the jurors
information purposed to inflame them against Mr. Tucker and to
induce a decision outside the relevant evidence and pertinent facts
of the theft case before them.
Contrary to rules 404(b) and 403, the State was allowed to
inquire into details, and obtain at least partial admissions, on
information unrelated to impeachment.
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The State's examination into

-

unadjudicated details of other crimes or wrongs not part of the plea
bargained conviction, particularly the allegations of cocaine usage
to the level of a drug habit, were highly improper under the
circumstances of this case.

These errors not only resulted in

violations of rules 403 and 404(b), they also abrogated fundamental
rights guaranteed Mr. Tucker under federal and state constitutional
provisions assuring him due process and the right to a fair trial.
United States Constitution, Amendments V, VI and XIV; Utah
Constitution, Article I, § § 7 and 12. 1
In United States v. Harding, 525 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1975),
the circuit court made the following observation in support of its
decision to reverse the conviction of the accused:
The rule that it is error to inquire about the
details of prior criminal conduct is so well
established that such error is cognizable despite
the absence of any objection by defense counsel.
Id. at 88-89.

In Harding, the court found error even in the absence

of an objection to the prosecutors questions which in part implied
that the defendant had testified falsely about his prior
conviction.

The court stated:

1

Notably, our Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that
Utah's due process clause may well exceed the protections afforded
under the federal counterpart. See, e.g., State v. Watts, 750 P.2d
1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah
1986). The Court actually has already extended Utah's due process
protections safeguarding against the prejudicing effect of other
crimes evidence in another context. State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d
738, 742 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah
1980) (due process violated when prejudicial other crimes evidence
reaches the jury where severance would have cured the prejudice).

- 26 -

In addition to the improper inquiry about details of
the prior offense, some of the prosecutor's
questions implied that appellant testified falsely
about the offense even though the prosecutor knewf
or certainly should have known, that his testimony
was accurate. Thus, he asked if the offense was not
possession with intent to distribute, rather than
simple possession, and later, whether the defendant
was not mistaken in his description of the offense.
It is true, of course, that possession of 80 pounds
of marijuana strongly implied guilt of possession
with an intent to distribute, but this fact does not
justify the federal prosecutor's misdescription of
the charge which the State of Indiana elected to
prosecute. The misdescription was prejudicial in
two ways: first, it characterized the earlier
offense as somewhat more serious than it actually
was; second, and of greater importance, it
improperly implied that the prosecutor knew the
witness was lying when, in fact, he knew that the
witness was telling the truth.
Id. at 90-91.
As in Harding, the prosecutor in this case improperly
implied that Mr. Tucker had lied when he failed to admit more than
one check and an amount over one hundred dollars.

The Harding Court

acknowledged this type of behavior as establishing greater prejudice
than the implication that the crime was more serious than it was.
Both problems are present in the case at bar.

As in Harding, this

Court should find plain error in the trial court's ruling allowing
the detailed cross-examination into the facts of other checks and
amounts beyond the plea bargained conviction.
In United States v. Roenigk. 810 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1987),
the Court of Appeals reversed a conviction because the prosecutor
had exceeded permissible impeachment principles by excessive
exploration of the details behind the impeaching prior conviction.
The Roenigk Court explained that excessive references to details of
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prior criminal conduct improperly allows jurors to infer a defendant
is more likely to have committed the charged offense.

Id. at 815.

The Court stated that such behavior by the government "may be so
prejudicial as to amount to plain error."

Id. at 814.

At issue in Roeniak was a relationship between the
defendant and a known drug trafficker.

The amount of emphasis

placed on this relationship and the crimes of the drug trafficker
improperly allowed the jurors to consider and find the defendant was
more likely to have committed the crime of perjury; the court called
this possibility an improper basis and reversed under both plain
error and an abuse of discretion standard.

Id. at 816.

In United States v. Tumblin, 551 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1977),
the prosecutor examined the defendant about details behind his
convictions including length of confinement, periods between
confinement and defendant's unemployment between crimes.
1002.

Id. at

The Court found the questions regarding the unemployment

status of the defendant between crimes to particularly exceed the
scope of reasonable cross-examination.

The Court stated:

The obvious significance of this questioning was not
to damage defendant's credibility as a witness—the
fact of conviction alone achieved that goal—but
instead to suggest, quite improperly, that defendant
was a man who had spent most of his young life
committing and serving time for the crimes, rather
than being gainfully employed.
Id. at 1004.
While Mr. Tucker's criminal history in no way parallels
that of appellant Tumblin, the prosecutor's use of this type of
questioning on cross-examination in this case—connecting the prior
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conviction and alleged drug habit to an assertion of drug usage and
unemployment in connection with the instant offense—was in no way
lost on the jury.

The effect on Mr. Tucker was the same as in

Tumblin; the accused's substantial rights were prejudiced.

In

Tumblin, the Court rejected a claim of harmless error and found
reversible error to have occurred.

This Court should similarly find.

Notably, in both United States v. Harding and United
States v. Roenicrk, the courts noted that a limiting instruction had
not been given.
respectively.
factor.

Id.

525 F.2d at 91, and 810 F.2d at 816 n.2,
In neither case was this concern the dispositive

However, the court in United States v. Dow, 457 F.2d

246 (7th Cir. 1972), examined this issue directly.

The Dow court

noted that questions aimed at obtaining details beyond the mere fact
of the conviction itself to show a pattern of conduct and inflame
the jury is reprehensible, amounts to plain error, and does such
extensive and serious damage that the harm cannot be removed by a
cautionary instruction limiting the use of the information.
250.

Id. at

Therefore, the fact that the trial court sua sponte provided a

limiting instruction to jurors at the time of the impeachment
(R. 125 at 34) and then again in general instructions (R. 79) can in
no way obviate the prejudice inherent in the prosecutor's improper
examination.
In State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989), the Utah
Supreme Court observed that the requirements for finding plain
error, obviousness and harmfulness, pose no rigid and insurmountable
barrier for review.

Id. at 35 n.8. The above discussion
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demonstrates both requirements have been met on the facts of this
case and that the substantial rights of Mr. Tucker have been
violated.

Similarly, the above cases go a long way to establish

that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling the
objection lodged by Mr. Tucker and in denying his Motion for
Mistrial.

Notably, the Roenigk court found an abuse of discretion

by the trial court for failing to sustain the objection to testimony
which presented evidence of an alleged drug involvement between the
defendant and a known drug dealer and which bore no relationship to
the charged crime or impeachment under Rule 609(a).

810 F.2d at

815-16.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that where a reasonable
likelihood exists that the error complained of affected the outcome
of the trial, eroding confidence in the verdict and suggesting that
absent the error more than a mere possibility exists that the
defendant would obtain a more favorable result, reversal of the
conviction is warranted.

State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah

1989); State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987).
is such a case.

This case

Numerous reasons exist to establish the erosion of

confidence necessary to merit a new trial.
Notably, recent cases from the Utah Supreme Court
demonstrate a strong aversion to the gratuitous admission of
evidence of prior crimes, wrongs or acts.

State v. James, 767 P.2d

549, 556-57 (Utah 1989); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 494-98 (Utah
1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring opinion, joined by Stewart, J., and
Durham, J.); State v. Lanier. 778 P.2d 9, 10-11 (Utah 1989);
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State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738f 741 (Utah 1985).

See, also.

State v. Cox, 127 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 19-20 (Ct. App. January 31,
1990) (prior unprosecuted sexual assaults not so unique nor current
enough to outweigh prejudice inherent in admission into evidence;
reversal required).
Also, the State's case was far from overwhelming.

The jury

acquitted Mr. Tucker of the burglary charge despite the
co-defendant's testimony that Mr. Tucker assisted in the burglary
and the theft (R. 125 at 66).

No doubt this fact strongly states

that the testimony of Mr. Kanares was ignored by the jurors inasmuch
as he admitted informing defense counsel on three separate occasions
that Mr. Tucker was not involved in the crimes and that his story
changed only after the State dismissed two other third degree felony
charges against him (R. 125 at 69, 75). Other than Mr. Kanares'
testimony, the case against Mr. Tucker was wholly circumstantial.
Admittedly, evidence was adduced by Mr. Tucker himself that
he was present at the Redwood Road address and that he was later
found hiding under a bed at the Kanares' residence where stolen
property was found in Mr. Kanares' car (R. 125 at 17-23).

This

evidence, however, does not establish the crime of theft.
Mr. Tucker's explanations for his behavior were consistent with
innocence.

Because of the circumstantial nature of the case against

him, Mr. Tucker's testimony was crucial to the defense.

When the

State introduced evidence of other thefts, the five checks, and
allegations of drug addiction to cocaine, the jurors probably
utilized this information to reject his testimony and determine
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guilt based on his purported bad character.

Importantly, the State

reiterated these improper charges in closing argument as well
(R. 125 at 83-84).

This erroneous information therefore improperly

tipped the balancing of deliberations against Mr. Tucker.
Admission of the drug addiction over the objection of
Mr. Tucker may have single-handedly assured the conviction against
him.

Few crimes today carry the stigma associated with drugs and

particularly drug addiction.

The prosecutor's inquiry into a

court-ordered attendance at a drug program implied a measure of
addiction which jurors may have inferred as incurable and no doubt
used in considering his propensities toward deviant behavior.

These

feelings were only exacerbated when the prosecutor erroneously
linked the past drug admissions to his current status as an
unemployed and possibly reformed addict.
Such contentions presented to the jurors adversely affected
Mr. Tucker's rights to obtain a fair trial from an impartial* jury.
The prosecutor's introduction of his information violated due
process as guided by evidence rules 404(b) and 403.

The trial court

erroneously overruled meritorious objections to the introduction of
this damaging and misleading evidence and improperly denied
Mr. Tucker's Motion for Mistrial.
the outcome of the trial.

These errors erode confidence in

Absent the errors, a reasonable

likelihood exists that the outcome would have been more favorable to
Mr. Tucker.

It follows that his conviction should be reversed and a

new trial ordered.
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CONCLUSION
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Tucker
respectfully requests that this Court reverse his improperly
obtained conviction and remand his case to the district court for
dismissal of the charges or a new trial absent such errors.
Respectfully submitted this (7~l ^

day of March, 1990.

^*4f

^X

BROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney^ft5r9 Def endant/Appellant

ID G. UDAYY
Attorney for Defendant^A^pellant
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ADDENDUM A

24
shed or shop?
A

No.

Q

Did you at any time ever have in your possession

or take any items of property which have been identified
as belonging to Mr. Hansen and having come at some time
from that shed?
A

No. I had never seen the property until it was

taken out of the trailer by the police officers.
Q

Did you have further plans of your own that

afternoon?
A

I did.

Q

What were they?

A

I had a job interview at 3:30 with West Valley

Transmissions.
Q

Were you able to keep that?

A

No.
MR. JONES:

Objection as to relevance.

THE COURT:

Sustained.

That will be

stricken.
Q

(By Ms. Wells) Mr. Tucker, have you previously

been convicted of any criminal offenses?
A

Yes.

Q

And what was that offense and when?

A

In March of 1988 I was convicted of a forgery,

attempted forgery.

Attempted forgery, Class A misdemeanor.

Q

And that was a misdemeanor rather than a felony?

A

Yes.

Q

Would you please explain briefly the circumstances

Z3

surrounding that offense and your ultimate conviction?
Let me ask: Did you enter a plea in that matter?
A

Yes.

Q

What were the circumstances surrounding that case?

A

My sister and I were sharing a house, and I was

putting my money into her bank account. We had a dispute
and I wanted my money out of her account.

It's a joint

account with my mother's name on the checks.
She wouldn't refund my money, my parents were on
vacation and I needed my money cause I was moving out of the
house. And in order to get another house I needed my money.
So I forged my sister's signature to get my money.
Q

How much money was involved?

A

Less than $100.

Q

Again, did you enter a plea of guilty after being

charged with that offense?
A

Yes.
MS. WELLS: That's all the questions

I have.
CROS S -EXAMINAT ION
BY MR. JONES:
Q

Mr. Tucker, do you think you have a good recollec-

tion of the case for which you pled guilty to?
A

Do I —

Q

The attempted forgery that you just talked about

to the Jury?
A

Oh, yes.

Q

Isn't it true that you stole five checks from your

26
1

mother?

2
3

A

Yes.

Q

And forged her name on those checks, didn't you?

A

Yes.

Q

One of the checks—the one you pled guilty to

4
5

was in excess of $500, wasn't it?

6

A

I think so.

7

Q

So you are not telling the Jury that you stole

8

$100, are you?

9

A

No.

10

Q

How much, all totaled, did you steal from your

11

mother through those checks?
A

Number one, I didn't steal it.

It was my money.

Q

Well, you took checks, you stole blank checks

12
13

from your mother, didn't you?

14

A

I did.

15

Q

And you forged her signature on five of those?

16

A

I did.

17

Q

How much money did you take?

18

A

I would say around six hundred something.

Q

You are telling us that the one check was in

19

excess of $500 and the other four altogether only totaled
20
$100?
21
22
23
24
25

A

There was a few that were not cashed.

There was

one in my wallet that had never been cashed.
Q

Well, isn't it true that you had had these checks

for some time?
A

Yes.

1

Q

How long had you had these checks?

A

2
3 1
4

Probably three days.

Q

Y

A

I don't think so.

Q

Isn't it true that the reason that you took the

°u didn't have them more like three months?

5
checks and cashed them was to support your drug habit?
6

A

No.

7

MS. WELLS: Your Honor, I would object--

8

I would ask the Court for a ruling and would like to approach

9 I the Bench.
10

THE COURT:

JJ I objection.

I'm going to overrule the

The door has been opened as to the purpose for

the money on direct examination.

12

MS. WELLS:

13

I don' t believe that the

door was opened in that it wasn't asked of him for what
14
purpose.
15
16

He merely said it was his money. And I think what

this does is goes to a rule of evidence 404 problem,
I

THE COURT:

Do you need to proceed

18 I

MR. JONES:

I do, Your Honor.

19

THE COURT:

Let's come to the side bar

17

20

further on this?

for just a moment.
(Bench conference off the record.)

21
THE COURT: The objection is overruled.
22
Q
23
24
25 I

(By Mr. Jones) Mr. Tucker, is it your testimony

to the Jury that the only reason you took those five checks
is because you were entitled to the money?
A

Yes.

28

Q

Do you remember filling out a statement, kind

of a questionnaire or statement why you took that money?

A

To a certain degree, yes.

Q

Did you ever tell anyone in that statement that

the reason you took the money was to support a drug habit?

A

1 can't remember.

Q

Were you on cocaine in April of 1988?

A

Had I used cocaine?

Q

Yes.

A

A few times, yes.

Q

Did you have a drug problem?

A

Not really a problem.

Q

Well, have you entered or been ordered to go

into a drug rehabilitation program?

A

I completed it, yes.

Q

Did you complete the program?

A

Yes.

Q

And when was that?

A

I was ordered in, I think, June of 1988, to go.

Q

Was it your testimony that you didn't have a

drug probl em at the time you entered that plea?

A

No.

Q

Excuse me, in April of 1988—

A

Yes, sir.

Q

—you had a drug problem at that time?

A

It was going to become a problem, yes.

Q

What about in March of 1989?

A

I have been clean for over a year.

I entered a plea of guilty.

1 I

Q

You were unemployed at the time of this incident?

A

Yes.

Q

And it's your testimony that you just happened

to be in the wrong place at the wrong time on March 29, 1989?
A

So to speak.

Q

You had no idea what your friend was up to?

A

Exactly.

^

Q

You weren't on drugs that day?

8 I

A

No.

9 I

Q

Is it true that the only person who was hiding

10
11

when the officers got there was yourself?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

And your testimony is that Mr. Kanares is the one

12
who was responsible for this burglary and theft; is that right?
13

A

Yes.

14

Q

But he wasn't hiding, was he?

15

A

No, he was not.

16

Q

And the only reason you were hiding is because

17
18
19

you were afraid?
A

That, and I had a speeding ticket that had went

to a warrant, and I have done thirty days in jail on the
forgery, and I had no desire to go back to jail.

20
Q
21
22
23
24

You weren't hiding, I guess, because of what

happened over at Mr. Hansen's property?
A

No. At the time on the forgery I was beat up

real bad by the police, and again that same day.
Q

When did you know or realize that this property

25 was stolen?

ADDENDUM B

40
1

indicated to the Court at the side bar during the first

2 J break that I would like an opportunity to make a record
3

and to make a further motion.
THE COURT:

Right.

4
MS. WELLS: Your Honor, at this time
5
I would make a motion for a mistrial. The defendant made an
6
7

appropriate motion in limine prior to the beginning of the
trial, which was subsequently heard and ruled on by the Court.

8
9
JQ
11

Although the Court did not grant that motion, it
was clearly, I believe, the order of the Court that such
admission by Mr.Tucker, should he testify, and of course under
the case law he is required to testify in order to get the
benefit of the motion and preserving it for appeal, and during

12
that testimony he admitted to the conviction for attempted
13
forgery, a Class A misdemeanor.
14

He was not requested on direct examination to make

15

any explanation beyond admission of the fact of the forgery

16

itself, which constitutes the crime.

However, on cross-

17 J examination Mr. Jones elicited from him additional information
18
19

which I believe was elicited contrary to the ruling of the
Court, contrary to the spirit of the motion in limine, and
in violation of Rule 404, the Utah Rules of Evidence, parti-

20
cularly subsection B dealing with other crimes, wrongs, or
21
22

acts.
It indicates therein that evidence of other crimes,

23 wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
24 person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.
25 It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as

41
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity or a sense of mistake or accident.
There is no exception listed within 404B that
deals with the requirement that he explain one act by having
to then admit to some other wrong that could not otherwise
fit into Rule 404.
It was clearly the intent of the prosecution to
use that information to further inflame the Jury and indicate
to them that this was a person of bad character, more likely
to have engaged in criminal activity in March of 1989, than
not.
That is particularly true in light of the specific
reason for which he might be impeached upon testifying, which
is to cast doubt based upon that particular crime itself,
as to credibility.

The crime that he talked about paying

drug debts obviously deals with a different type of offense
that is not contemplated in the arguments made to the Court
or in the Court's ruling and its analysis under the Banner
test.

It was merely thrown in as an addition by counsel,

and it constitutes unfair prejudice and should warrant a
mistrial by the Court.
THE COURT:

All right. I have had plenty

of time to think about this, and the record should reflect
that while not to this extent, the matters were discussed at
the side bar conference and a proffer at the time of the
objection was made, was noted, and it was not on the record
because it was at the side bar.

I overruled that objection,

land I am going to deny the motion for a new trial for the

following reasons: Under normal circumstances the prosecution]
based on my ruling, has the right to have before the Jury
the fact of the conviction and what the conviction was for.
In this particular case, however, as a matter of strategy,
and appropriate strategy, the defendant through his counsel
sought to bring up the information before the prosecution
had an opportunity to. That is a strategic choice, and it's
probably a good one. But in so doing it was not just a
statement of conviction and what the conviction was for.
There was furthermore testimony elicited by direct examination as to what the purpose was for the act underlying the
conviction in question.
Once that was done, the door was opened for the
prosecution to do more than it was otherwise entitled to do.
My memory of that testimony was that Mr. Tucker went into
the purposes for which he wrote bad checks. Once he did that,
then the prosecution is entitled to ask questions on cross
to address the question of the purposes for the withdrawals
of money.
As far as I'm concerned, that's all Mr. Jones did.
Furthermore, and for that reason, I don't think 404B is
pertinent because it was related not to additional wrongs or
act, but instead was related only to the conviction in
question, and in attempting to cross-examine Mr. Tucker on
the reasons for the withdrawals. For that reason I think
your 404B is not appropriate, so the motion is denied.
MS. WELLS:
thing, Your Honor?

May I just indicate one more
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Criminal No.

Defendant
, under oath, hereby acknowledge tl
guilty to the charge(s)
of:
e(sjo£
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t

'
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Elements:

VtdJbLH
t/

CUjflwfaGzt&t

C
"ThAS-ZudL
(U/~\

~i "jfc&Z;

JdJj^iY^

ijau.l^

-T2JLAIVLL*X

£T3<^_

a copy of the charge (Information)
arid understand the crime I am pleading guilty to is a
rmation) aw

r>^-o
(Degree of Felony or Class of Misdemeanor)
and understand the punishment for this crime may be

-&A +

. prison term,
tide 63-63-9(2) U.C.A. as amended, or both. I am not on drugs or alcohol.

fine, plus a 25% surcharge, pursuant to

My plea of guilty isfreelyand voluntarily made. I am represented by Attorney
who has explained myrightsto me and I understand them.
1. I know that I have a constitutional right to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I have
entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by a judge should I desire.
2. I know that if I wish to have a trial. I have arightto see and hear the witnesses against me in open court in my presence
and before the Judge and jury with therightto have those witnesses cross examined by my attorney. I also know that I have a
right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court upon my behalf and that I could testify on my own
behalf, and that if I choose not to do so, the jury will be told that this may not be held against me.
3. I know that if I were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and every element of the crime charged beyond a
reasonable doubt, that any verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not guflty must be by a complete
agreement of all jurors.
4. 1 know that under the constitution that I have arightnot to give evidence against myself and that this means that I cannot
be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless I choose to do so.
5. I know that under the constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I would have a
right to appeal my conviction a nd sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial proceedings and that if I could
0 not afford to pay the costs for > ch appeal, that those costs would be paid by the State without cost to me.
6. 1 know and understand that by entering a plea of guilty I am giving up my constitutionalrightsas set out in the proceeding
paragraphs and that I am admitting I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of guilty is entered.
7. I also know tht if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which I have been convicted
or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the nrespnt artiVm m «.
«* •-

9. No promises or threats of any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty. The following other charges
pending against me, to-wit: (Court case number(s) or count(s)):

X

will be dismissed, and that no other charge(s) will befiledagainst me for othercrimes I may have committed which
are now known to the prosecuting attorney. I am also aware that any charge or sentencing" concessions or
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made
or sought by either defense counsel or counsel for the State, is not binding on the Judge and may not be approved by
the Judge.
10. I have read this Affidavit, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I know and understand its contents. I
am
o ^ / years of age, have attended school through the
understand the English language.
Dated this

A

. day of.
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Subscribed and^w^nJtoJbdoie me in Court this.
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. and 1 can read and
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Defendant

TH .day of

H. DIXON HiNDLEY
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Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE }

JLf %uJu. , the defendant named above and 1 know he'
I certify that I am the attorney fori
has read the Affidavit, or that I have read it to him, and I discussed it with him and believe he fully understands the
meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief the statements,
representations and declarations made by the defendant inine ijoregoing Affidavit are in all respects accurate and true.
Defense Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY:
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case a g a i n s t ^ ^ A w M ^ //X^CX^fcnHant
I have reviewed the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations are true and accurate. No improper
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant. TJ*£felfc reasonable cause to
believe the evidence would support the conviction of th^d^fendant f^f the plea offere^arjd that acceptance of the plea
would serve the public interest.

ORDER
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds the defendant's plea of
guilty is freely and voluntarily made and ijLis ordered that defendant's plea of "Guilty" to the charge, set forth in the
Affidavit be accepted and entered.
^^Done in Court this

ATTEST
H. DIXCN HiNDLEY

LL

day of

